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*Tampeños and Miamenses: Analyzing the Impact and Influence of Two Cuban Exile Communities through Two Revolutions*

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Abstract

This paper examines and compares two Cuban exile communities that emerged in the United States in the wake of political unrest in Cuba, and assesses the influence both communities have had on the island’s society and culture. The first community, the *Tampeños*, emerged at the turn of the 20th century in Tampa, Florida. The second community, the *Miamenses*, have existed since the early 1960s in Miami, Florida. An examination of these communities reveals that there are close similarities between their genesis, purpose and behavior in the host country. However, there are stark differences between how each group has come to be perceived by their compatriots in their home country. One group is revered; the other despised. This paper juxtaposes the belief systems that governed the creation of these communities, and explains how one group was perceived to have held on to principles considered sacred in Cuban society, and how the other group was perceived to have betrayed those same principles.
One need not be a scholar of history or geography to have heard about Cuba. In fact, the story of the tiny island nation and its recalcitrant and vocal leader reads like fiction: in 1959, in the midst of the Cold War, Fidel Castro and his band of “barbudos”—bearded ones who had been hiding in the mountains for years—somehow took over the country. At the time he took over, Cuba was a favorite playground of the U.S. It was a place where Americans shrugged off their inhibitions: there they gambled, they drank, danced and indulged in all types of sexual vices. The Cuban government of Fulgencio Batista took the country’s role as provider and procurer of American fantasies very seriously—so much so that Batista hired Meyer Lansky, a man with ties to organized crime in the United States, to ensure that Cuba’s gambling operations ran smoothly and stayed clean.

Batista, however, found it hard to keep his own affairs as smooth and clean as the country’s gambling operations. He knew his days were numbered and eventually, the Cuban people would bring him to task. He had skimmed millions of dollars from the Cuban treasury and lived an openly lavish lifestyle. He and his national guard were responsible for thousands of murders of counterrevolutionaries. Cuban newspapers of the day published photographs of dead young men, their bodies lying in the streets because they had run afoul of the government. So on December 31, 1958, Batista threw a extravagant party to bring in the New Year. Before dawn, he boarded a plane with a suitcase full of absconded funds, and went into exile.

January 1, 1959 saw the dawn of a new day. The party was over. Castro and his “barbudos” promptly outlawed gambling, prostitution and any number of other sins. The system they would put in place provoked hundreds of thousands of Cubans to leave the country. Those Cubans believed theirs would be a temporary exile. More than 40 years later, they still wait for Castro’s demise.

The Cuban exodus of the early 1960s was not a new phenomenon. It had happened before, in the 1860s, 1890s, and the 1920s and 30s. The first group of Cubans to make a home in the U.S. arrived with the cigar factories. They created exile communities that eventually became instrumental in the country’s fight for independence from Spain. The most famous of these communities was in Tampa, Florida, and the Cubans who settled there came to be known as Tampeños.
Cuban historians in Cuba today still wax wistfully about the *Tampeños*. The *Tampeños* were family. They faced discrimination and Jim Crow laws to work in the cigar factories in the U.S. Legend has it that they put aside a tenth of their salaries to finance the independence movement. In contrast, today’s Cuban exiles in Miami don’t inspire the same wistfulness. They are not family.

What has made one set of Cuban exiles revered, while another is despised? What was so special about these *Tampeños* that Cubans have made them part of Cuban history? This paper seeks to answer those exact questions.

**Examining Exiles, Expatriates & Immigrants**

Before we can continue, we must examine terminology. Most of the scholarly literature concerning these groups refers to them as “exiles,” and almost never as immigrants or expatriates. This begs the question: why call them exiles at all? The Irish, who headed in droves to American shores during the 1840s—some 25 years before the first groups of Cubans emigrated to the U.S—had been branded “immigrants,” supposedly because they were escaping hunger, political conflict and persecution. Yet, when the first Cubans arrived in the U.S. during the 1860s, they also were escaping an imminent war that would bring hunger, political conflict and persecution. So why were the Cubans dubbed exiles?

To answer the question requires a dissection of the definition of those words in order to arrive at their literal and figurative meanings, and an examination of the classic uses of those words in order to determine their societal meaning.

Strictly speaking, there seems to be little difference between an exile, an expatriate and an immigrant: each resides outside of his or her respective country. More specifically, *Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary* (2004, http://www.m-w.com) defines an exile as someone who has been “banished or expelled” from his country; the *Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition* (2003) adds that an exile also can be a person who voluntarily leaves his country, “sometimes in order to escape punishment.” The same entry also explains the notion in international law of a “government-in-exile” as a person or group living abroad but “claiming to be the rightful government” of a given country.
An expatriate is defined as one “who withdraws himself from residence in or allegiance to his native country.” An immigrant is simply defined as person who leaves his native country to settle in another.

Clearly, all three terms are not mutually exclusive. They have become politically charged, and the context in which each is used differs. Notwithstanding its present-day meaning in this world of multinationals, the classic definition of an expatriate is an individual, often an intellectual, who takes up residence in another country, often of his own volition. The word was widely used to describe writers and artists who, during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, fled to Europe and New York City to escape racial, sexual or political repression (Bomani & Rooks 1992; Pizer 1996; Sawin & Alix 1999; Wiser 2000). Disillusioned with the society from which they had emerged, these intellectuals sought to create a more enlightened society anchored by new national identity fostering a political, and sometimes, an economic agenda, different from the old and current regimes. Many expatriates advocated radical ideas: racial, gender and sexual equality, women’s suffrage, Marxism, nationalism and pan-Americanism.

If the expatriate is the radical leftist on the political spectrum, then exiles are their polar opposites, the reactionaries. Exiles also have a political agenda, but in the past two centuries, they have come to be characterized as groups interested in seeking the overthrow of a current government in order to replace it with some version of a previous one (Chomsky, 1985; Forment, 1989; Shain, 1990, 1994; Walt, 1992; Williams, 1970). Demographer Eton F. Kunz, who did extensive work in the field of refugees and exile movements and migration, loosely defines exiles as people who have suffered a protracted, enforced absence from their homeland; their main preoccupation, he writes, is with their new relationship with their native country and their role in its future (1973, p. 133).

Further, Kunz divides these émigrés into three main categories: “majority-identified” exiles who are convinced that their anti-government beliefs reflect those of the rest of their countrymen; “events-alienated” exiles who find themselves forced to migrate because they suddenly are unwanted by their fellow countrymen; and “self-alienated” exiles who choose not to identify with their nation or its people because they are incompatible with the current system. He adds that at times, circumstances can overlap (1981, p. 45), but in all cases, it is
understood that the initial migration was not voluntary, and that refugees experience a real fear of persecution for political, religious or similar types of reasons (1973 p. 140).

One vital element Kunz adds to the literature, that also is important to this paper, is the concept of “vintages” of migration: waves of refugee immigration comprising people of the same nationality who arrive at different points in the history of a diaspora. Each vintage, he writes, is “distinctly different in character, background and avowed political faith” (1973 p. 137). Kunz’ theory of vintages is evidenced and illustrated by the differences between the various generations of Cubans who have settled in the U.S. since colonial times.

The third group—“Labor” Immigrants as they are called by sociologist Alejandro Portes—often are anathema in their time and appreciated only in retrospect. They are defined as voluntary migrants who choose to leave their native countries primarily to seek economic opportunities abroad (Anthia 1998, Portes 1984).

Expatriates, Exiles, Immigrants and the “Home” Culture

The difference between an exile and an expatriate is not in who or what they are, because both have suffered a disconnection from their native country. The difference is in how they demand a change in leadership. Exiles, it can be said, work against the current of the present government in the home society. They are a threat to the present government because they seek to regain power or restore a former system, often without thought to any progress that has since been made since the former leadership departed. Exiles are excessively preoccupied with events back in the home country, and often gather in the host country expecting the eventual overthrow of the current government. As a result, they become only peripheral members of the host society, gaining political influence and becoming the caretakers of the cultural memory of a specific time and space. Like Kunz, Portes writes that exiles “neither wish to assimilate nor are they concerned with ethnic stereotypes,” (Portes, 1984, p. 384) because, unlike immigrants, they are not in the host country to forge a new life, but awaiting a return to the old one in their home countries.

Like the exile, the expatriate also is preoccupied with events at home. But the expatriate is a different breed; he exists in both the host and the home culture simultaneously. The dissent of the expatriate expressed abroad seems to flow along with the current of government
rhetoric back home, slowly becoming incorporated into the system, gradually becoming part of the national mainstream. The expatriate connection to the nation is spiritual, and the ideals of the expatriate culture can be (and in past instances have been) woven into the fabric of the history and culture of the native land once reunification takes place.

This is something that rarely happens in the case of exiles and immigrants. Portes, in his studies on ethnic awareness and assimilation among immigrants and exiles (Portes, 1998, Portes, Parker, & Cobas, 1980, Portes & MacLeod, 1999), seems to suggest that labor immigrants are most receptive to the process of assimilation, mainly because their need for economic opportunity makes them sensitive to how they are perceived by the host society. Driven by labor needs, they are inclined to assimilate or at least to improve their perception in the eyes of the host culture in order to improve their economic opportunities (1984, 384).

Portes adds that some exiles forced to remain abroad for protracted periods—as in the case of Cuban exiles in Miami—eventually, like immigrants, also become receptive to assimilation because they realize that their continued survival in the host society relies on that society’s perception of them. Over generations, these groups make the progression from social “outsiders” to social “insiders,” and develop a sense of ethnic identity that determines their role in the host society and what they must do in order to get their share of resources in the community. They gradually cease to be exiles and eventually accept their role as another ethnic minority in American society.

Expatriates vs. Exiles in the “Host” Culture

Perhaps the greatest challenge to any émigré is the tension between wanting to maintain a specific cultural identity and the temptation to lose himself in the host culture. Like immigrants, exile cultures face the constant pressure to assert themselves or assimilate because they need to survive in the host culture. Most exiles, writes Kunz, face a choice of two extremes: to dedicate themselves totally to bringing about change in the home country or to assimilate totally into the host culture. How they respond to the pressures depends largely on whether they are majority-identified, events-alienated or self-alienated exiles. Events alienated exiles are just as likely to dedicate themselves to bringing about social change as they are to turn to turn their backs completely on the country and the people who rejected them. They may behave like most self-alienated exiles, who are most likely to engage in
anarchical and revolutionary activities in order to bring about change in their native countries, even at the risk of jeopardizing their position in the host country.

Majority-identified groups are more complex, Kunz writes, because they are motivated by guilt and shame for having left behind compatriots in trouble (Kunz, 1981, p. 45-46). These communities are most likely to be composed of individuals who advocate both extremes, and the resulting culture often is some combination of both the native culture and the host culture. The community that Kunz describes sounds much like the community of Cuban exiles in Tampa studied by Patrick Gallagher (Gallagher, 1980), which is discussed later in this paper.

Kunz also introduces the concept of a limbo in which exiles exist, at least until they succumb to the pressure to repatriate or become an ethnic group in the host society. He calls it “the no-man’s land of midway-to-nowhere and the longer he remains here, the longer he becomes subject to its demoralizing effects” (1973, p. 133). His subsequent studies (1984) seem to suggest that self- and event-alienated exiles are most vulnerable to this state and so are most likely to embrace the extremes of assimilation and revolution.

Hamid Naficy (1993) explores more fully the concept of that “no-man’s land” in his study of Iranian exiles. Naficy suggests that exiles exist in “exilic liminality,” a term he derived from one coined by anthropologist Arnold Van Gennep in his work, *Rites of Passage* (1908). Liminality is a threshold, a space between stages, and those in a liminal state exist in both worlds. Van Gennep compared this to the case of a person who crosses a national border—a political demarcation that can be clearly seen on a map, but is sometimes not so readily seen on the physical plane. Although there may be a physical line or a river that separates one country from another, the basic geography around that point of demarcation might be so similar as to make one side indistinguishable from the other. It is, in essence, a neutral zone, a “sacred space” that marks the transition from one point to the other (1960, p. 11). So, argued Van Gennep, are the stages that distinguish one part of life from another: in some cultures, the transition from girlhood to womanhood is marked by an event—menstruation—but the difference between the girl and the woman is almost nil: she does not become a woman overnight, but remains in the transitional, liminal stage for a period of time.

Likewise, says Naficy, an exile exists in a limbo—neither a full member of the host culture, nor a participating member of his native culture. That state of “being both while being
neither” necessitates the crafting of a new identity that merges the two states of being. Thus, while Naficy does not dispute, or even address expatriate culture, his definition of an exilic culture suggests that exiles exist in a “slipzone” that oscillates between two realms (p. 7).

Portes (1984) does not use the term exilic liminality, but like Naficy, he suggests that exiles in general and Cuban exiles in particular, existed in a “no-zone,” at least until external (failure to topple Castro) and internal (domestic anti-Cuban sentiment) pressures forced them to develop an awareness of their ethnic identity in the United States. This will be discussed more thoroughly in the next section.

Expatriates—or what Kunz calls majority-identified exiles—face the same challenges to self-identity that immigrants and exiles do, but they seem less vulnerable to that sense of liminality, and again, their response is what makes them distinctive. These émigrés tend to depart en masse, and arrive in waves or vintages; they also tend to settle in close geographic proximity to one another. This allows for the creation of communities that contain a range of responses to the migration: revolutionaries share the stage with assimilationists, and community ideals take on degrees of both extremes. The expatriate culture that eventually evolves incorporates elements of both the native and the host cultures. It does not exist in a “slipzone” of identity because it basically identifies with the basic native culture but seeks to craft a new national identity based on different ideals. Because the expatriate ideals are the ideals of the majority, there is a symbiotic relationship between the expatriate community and the rest of the population in the native country. Expatriates maintain contact with persons in the home country, and even return to the country periodically.

An important characteristic of that culture is that it is infused with “historic responsibility” as well as with the practical understanding that part of the future of the nation relies on the émigrés’ success at their work or profession in the host country. Each segment of the émigré community is vital to the mission to bring about change in the homeland.

Following this theoretical model, the intellectuals in the community take on the dual tasks of crafting a national identity for the émigrés and creating ideals and principles by which to govern the nation, once regained. The wealthier members of the community produce the media, through which those ideals are transmitted to both exiles and those still at home. Less wealthy members of the community contribute in different ways, if at all, since in such a
community there would be a range of responses to the displacement, according to Kunz (1981, p. 46). Gradually, the expatriate communities become enclaves of the “nation-to-be,” a reflection of the principles and ideals that eventually become part of the new society crafted after reunification. Their identity, a hybrid of the native and host cultures, is not trapped within the constraints of a given time and place, as Naficy seems to suggest, but a vibrant, fluid developing culture that extends the story of the culture across national boundaries. In essence, it continues the story of one country and one culture across borders, told simultaneously at home and abroad.

Much of this model can be applied to Irish immigrants in the U.S. during the 1840s, as well as to the Cubans who began to arrive en masse 20 years after. Both groups found themselves compelled to leave—one by war, the other by hunger and religious persecution—both settled in relatively insular communities, and both had leaders who espoused their nation’s liberation from the grip of a tyrannical world power. The difference of course, is in how those early Cuban émigrés were called to action to aid their nation and in how they mobilized to support an effort that eventually led to Cuban independence.

Cuban Expatriates vs. Cuban Exiles

A major obstacle in trying to illustrate the difference between today’s Cuban exiles—the Miamenses—and yesterday’s émigrés—the Tampeños—is in how the terms “exile” and “expatriate” are used by scholars. Dozens of books have been written about and by Cubans who migrated abroad during various points in history, from the early 1800s, through the early Republicano period, to the current day. Some émigrés were true exiles, in the sense that they had been banished and forbidden to return: José Martí, for instance, was expelled twice from Cuba for fermenting insurrection. However, most could be described as expatriates, who disagreed with the governments and lived abroad but who could easily return to Cuba. During the bloody governments of Gerardo Machado (1925-33) and Batista (1952-59), some Cubans fled for political reasons, and were exiled for a period. Many more—especially those of color—were considered immigrants, looking for better opportunities in the U.S., although their behavior in the United States, again, resembled that of the expatriate.

Peréz notes in On Becoming Cuban (1999) that migration abroad was an almost natural part of the country’s national development; it was commonplace. Today, Cubans in Miami
describe their 40-year odyssey in the U.S. as “the Cuban Diaspora” (*The Miami Herald*, 2003) but, in truth, most of Cuban migration throughout history has been diasporic. From colonial times, hundreds of thousands of Cubans traveled abroad (mostly to the United States and Europe) to vacation and conduct business, live, find work, get an education, become politicized, and organize political dissent (Pérez, p. 46).

From the earliest days of the Republic to the present, the U.S. posed an attractive model to some Cubans, who felt that U.S. culture and its “affirmation of modernity, progress and above all civilization” (Peréz, 1999, p. 7) is desirable and should be emulated on the island. During the early part of the 20th century, Cubans traveled to the U.S. often, as having lived in or acquired an education in the U.S. was considered a status symbol.

The constant interaction between Cubans at home and Cubans abroad suggests that the expatriate movement abroad was indeed considered to be a natural extension of those movements led by Cubans on the island. In Cuban history, the cigar makers in Tampa and the *Mambises* who fought in Oriente are interwoven into the story of Cuban independence; entwined into the history of Cuban music are the stories of the “mambo kings”—Cuban artists and bandleaders like Frank “Machito” Grillo and Pérez Prado, and percussionist Luciano “Chano” Pozo, who lived in New York’s Upper East Side and became the kings of Latin jazz (Jacques, 1998, p. 253). They were at the core of a bohemian, radical community that was highly politicized. Jacques wrote that “jazz revolutionaries found a way to use Cuba as a reservoir of aesthetic inspiration and, implicitly, sociopolitical agitation; and as demographic and cultural changes” (p. 250), noting that Grillo and Pozo were integral in the incorporation of African and Latin rhythms into American jazz (p. 255).¹ The inclusion of these communities in the Cuban historical narrative is a credit to their ability to maintain ties with the home culture.

The same does not seem to apply today. Today’s Cuban exiles—the *Miamienses*—are considered alien to many Cubans on the island. Even among family members, the friction

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¹ This paper is part of a larger work that required extensive interviews with Cubans on the island, in the U.S., in Mexico and Spain. Throughout these interviews, the author was repeatedly surprised by the Cubans’ knowledge and perception of the early expatriate communities in the U.S. Knowledge that the author’s grandfather was a cigar-maker in Tampa elicited much discussion comparing past expatriates and current exiles. The author received the distinct impression that past communities were considered Cuban enclaves abroad, but that is not the case with the current exile community in Miami. This paper is based primarily on those discussions and observations.
and distrust between Cubans in Miami and Cubans on the island suggests that today’s Cuban exile community is not yet truly an expatriate community—it is not a majority-identified group. In fact, they seem instead to be an event-alienated group, unwanted by their compatriots. Whether this state of affairs exists because, in the past, Cubans fought against foreign domination and now they are, in essence, engaged in an ideological civil war, is a valid question that deserves to be examined.

Expatriates in Tampa and Exiles in Miami: A Comparison

One of the best illustrations of the endurance of expatriate communities is shown by Patrick Gallagher (1980), who discusses the evolution of 19th century Cuban communities in Tampa and Key West. Although Gallagher calls them “exile communities,” a better term would be expatriate communities, since they were Cubans who arrived in the United States fleeing political instability and war, and seeking economic opportunity, but they could freely return to their native country. Gallagher notes that although the groups “seemed to adapt well” (p. 25) and managed to create a niche for themselves in American society, the members of the community never fully assimilated; generations later, the children and grandchildren of these early expatriates maintain strong cultural ties to an island many have never visited.

About the descendents of the expatriates who live in Key West today, Gallagher wrote that “their temperament, their customs, and in most cases their language, since most are perfectly bilingual, mark them nonetheless as sons of Hispañola” (p. 29). He wrote that Tampa’s Ibor City, the center of that city’s Cuban community more than 100 years ago, is still “Spanish in language, custom and point of view” (p. 31). However, there have been concessions after more than a century of living on foreign soil; according to D. Lincoln Canfield, the Spanish spoken by the descendents of the original expatriates is poorly enunciated, and gives the impression of “pure carelessness, puro relajo” (1951, p. 43).

The first vintages of Cuban émigrés began to arrive during the 1860s. Years of political instability had preceded the start of the Ten Years War in 1868; once war broke out, Cubans fled to Europe, Mexico and the United States. Immediately after the war, the devastated economy led even more Cubans to Florida to find work. Ironically, most of those who arrived in the U.S. were Cuban tabaqueros, cigar-makers, who followed factory owners like Vicente Martínez Ybor to Key West and Tampa. Pérez (1995) notes that there were three
distinct classes of people who fled during that period:

A small group of separatists, largely of patrician origins, wealthy, and capable of enjoying a felicitous exile, settled in Europe. Other separatists, mostly middle-class professionals and businessmen, emigrated to New York, Philadelphia, and Boston. A third group, and by far the largest, consisted of Cuban workers. Unable to sustain exile without both employment and a dependable source of income, these workers tended to settle in the southeastern portion of the United States, most notably Florida—first in Key West and later in Tampa, Ocala, and Jacksonville (p. 25-26).

Clearly, the workers who followed the tobacco factories were immigrants in the classic sense, since they traveled to the U.S. seeking work opportunities. However, it also can be argued that they were expatriates, the same way Americans who live and work overseas are considered expatriates; both groups follow their livelihoods. This is further highlighted by the fact that the cigar factories moved to the U.S. to avoid not only the vicissitudes of the war in Cuba, but also to dodge the tariffs the U.S. had imposed on imported manufactured goods like cigars, but not on raw materials, like tobacco leaf. By moving their manufacturing operations to the U.S. mainland, the factory owners circumvented tariffs that would have crippled the Cuban cigar industry had it remained wholly in Cuba (p. 26).

The U.S. liberal laws promoting freedom of expression made it especially attractive to exiles interested in publishing newspapers—political organs that supported myriad issues, ranging from American annexation of the island, to self-government under Spanish rule, to total independence from the European power. During the Cuban Ten Years War of Independence (1868-78) and then again during the Final War of Independence (1895-98) Cuban exiles set up “governments-in-exile” in the United States. Much of the intellectual and political leadership lived in New York, Philadelphia and Boston.

Expatriate intellectual ideals and culture may have originated in expatriate communities in the northern U.S., but it was in the southern communities that those ideals came to be embodied. When José Martí—who was slated to become president of the independent Cuba—spoke to tabaqueros in Tampa in 1891, he was addressing a flourishing and politicized Cuban expatriate community that had experienced strikes, lockouts, and union-busting at the hands of cigar-factory owners. Afro-Cubans had smarted under the humiliations of an increasing number of Jim Crow laws. They had faced unsanitary living conditions, disease and almost non-existent medical care; they had responded by forming
mutual aid societies that provided medical care to patients regardless of their race. It is no surprise that they embraced Martí’s proposals for a Cuban nation that practiced economic parity and was free of social and racial discrimination.

Most important is the impact of this group on the native country. Tampa, especially, was one of the major seats of the Cuban independence movement in the late 1800s. The New York Junta, headed by Cuban revolutionary leader José Martí, maintained 15 national clubs in Tampa, through which the overthrow of the Spanish government was plotted and bankrolled (Gallagher p.31-32). It is notable that although American history rarely mentions this group, the story of the Cuban *tabaqueros* in the United States has become part of the Cuban mythology that surrounds the turn-of-the-century independence movement (Pérez 1999).

The ideals of this expatriate culture also became part of Cuban political philosophy. For instance, Martí’s essays—considered revolutionary for his day—promoted the abolition of slavery, agrarian reform, a closer unity among the Spanish-speaking countries in the Americas, and distancing from the United States. Other Latin American writers echoed Martí’s sentiments and added another: the need for women to participate in the revolutionary struggle. Although the outcome of the Spanish-American War resulted in a closer, not looser, Cuba-U.S. relationship, expatriate ideals reverberated in memory, fostering a deepening mistrust of the U.S. that contributed to the Revolution of 1959 (Pérez, 39-51).

The notion of an egalitarian democracy in which the political participation of all classes is equally important was another late 19th century expatriate ideal fostered by Martí and other progressives of the day. The concept, though long considered romantic and unattainable, has continued to spark the Latin American imagination: it was the basis for the Cuban revolution of 1959, and continues to live on today through the popularly elected, but troubled, administration of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez.

It should be noted that Latin American notions of egalitarianism and democracy, although inspired in part by the independence movement in the U.S., did not exactly mirror those of its northern neighbor. Martí, for instance, was skeptical of the American multi-party system, believing that it facilitated corruption and selfishness; he decried that “in North America the idea of working selflessly for the well-being of the nation clearly had been completely subordinated to the protection of personal interests” (Kirk, 1983, p. 71). Most of all, he
condemned the fact that the masses were influenced by political party bosses, and those bosses, in turn, were controlled by wealthy industrialists and corporations that were concerned only with profit. He warned that those same capitalist powers could easily extend their reach to Latin America, making the region vulnerable to efforts to destabilize progressive governments bent on instituting reforms.

But even if political and social egalitarianism was a goal, homogeneity was not. Expatriate culture was, and still is, by its very nature, elitist, distinguished by class notions of wealth and education. Naficy, in *The Making of Exile Cultures*, is careful to distinguish between poor immigrants (what Portes (1984) calls “labor” immigrants) and wealthier “exiles.” Although his comparison cannot be exactly applied to current Cuban exiles and expatriates, he is correct in his assumption that this group is generally perceived as “better”. For example, it can be argued that most Americans believe that Cuban exiles are wealthier and more educated and than say, Mexican immigrants who cross the border into the U.S. looking for employment.

The expatriate communities described by Gallagher and Pérez comprised the wealthy and the poor alike: the cigar factory owners looking to establish secure factories in a trouble-free region and the workers who followed them to Florida. In addition, those that followed comprised various racial and ethnic heritages: free blacks, mulattos, Creoles, Spaniards and even Italians and Conchs (people of Anglo-Saxon and Celtic descent) who sympathized with the Cuban cause (Gallagher p. 26; Pérez, p. 47). The revolutionary junta itself and the editorial board of its newspaper, *La Patria*, included free blacks, and the battlefield exploits of black general Antonio Maceo (dubbed “The Bronze Titan”) were reported in resplendent detail. Segregation in the U.S. eventually necessitated that black and white Cubans in Florida create separate “Club Cubanos,” but Martí in the early 1890s addressed each group indiscriminately, raising money for the war effort and spreading his mantra of social reform.

Although the problem of racial prejudice was far from eradicated, Martí attempted to lay the foundation for an egalitarian society by playing up Maceo’s exploits and tying together the notions of national liberation and racial equality. Pérez argues that although Martí’s efforts were simplistic—he advocated the denial of the Spanish and the African identities alike, in exchange for a “new Cuban” one—his approach was revolutionary and required a rethinking of the Cuban sense of identity (p. 92-95). The U.S. involvement in Cuban affairs that
followed the war for independence, and the creation of an oligarchy that favored American interests and reinforced colonial racial and class prejudices only served to fuel, not dampen, 19th century ideals.

In 1898, the War of Independence came to an inconclusive end when the U.S. defeated Spain and later occupied Cuba. Many expatriate intellectuals returned to Cuba to start the process of nation building, but in Tampa, most cigar makers stayed close to the factories, which showed no signs of closing and returning to Cuba. They relied heavily on their social clubs and mutual aid societies for political discourse and social activities, and as a way of preserving Cuban ideals and culture in a foreign country.

Ties to Cuba were not broken, however. Susan D. Greenbaum (1985) cites a 1911 Immigration Commission report on the cigar makers in Tampa that revealed that about half of the workers had returned to Cuba at least once since their arrival (p. 84). Afro-Cubans, caught between increasingly restrictive Jim Crow laws in Florida and burgeoning racism on the island, also opted to stay close to the factories. There were practical reasons:

The immigrants lived almost exclusively in Ybor City and West Tampa. These were clearly defined enclaves which surrounded the cigar factories and comprised worlds unto themselves. Within their confines, the Afro-Cubans led lives far different from their Afro-American counterparts in Tampa. Black cigar workers, virtually all of whom were Cuban, worked side by side with white workers, sharing a comparable wage scale. Black Cubans also lived among white Cubans and the other white immigrants. In sharp contrast to the American sections of Tampa, race relations in the immigrant neighborhoods were reportedly quite harmonious. (Greenbaum, p. 80)

This is not to say that racism did not affect the community. Around 1900, the effect of Jim Crow on the expatriate community became evident when whites were forced to expel their black members from their social clubs, or face charges of breaking segregation laws. Shortly thereafter, the Freethinkers of Martí-Maceo, an integrated mutual aid society and social club, was founded. In 1904, it merged with La Union, another social club, and was renamed La Unión Martí-Maceo. Mirabal (1998) writes that the club became a center of expatriate life for Afro-Cubans:

Afro-Cuban immigrants would go to La Unión Martí-Maceo to find out about job openings and housing opportunities, to socialize, and of course to discuss political developments in Cuba. In addition to being a place where Afro-Cubans could gather, the club offered any member who paid weekly dues of 25 cents complete medical care and financial compensation for lost income.
during illness or injury. Although not allowed to become formal members until the 1920s, Afro-Cuban women were pivotal to the club’s success (p. 57).

Mirabal has examined the meeting minutes and documents from that era leading up to the creation of the club; she notes that there are “silences” in those documents about the impetus for the creation of the club—the ejection of black members from other Cuban clubs. She suggests those silences demonstrate some level of shame from white Cubans, who had spent years being politicized by Martí during the years preceding the war for independence. One of Marti’s principal admonitions had been to demonstrate unity and not allow race to divide the community.

Yet, despite racial and social upheaval—including a massive northward migration of younger Afro-Cubans just before and during the depression (Greenbaum, p. 85)—the present-day Tampa described and analyzed by Pérez, Gallagher and others still maintains much of its Cubanidad. The historic Ybor City district and surrounding neighborhood have street names like “República de Cuba” and “Machado,” and the city has maintained much of the original architecture and building from that era. Many of the businesses cater to a clientele that still clings to Cuban roots, even though they are generations removed from the island: restaurants offer Cuban specialties like churrasco that are difficult to find outside Cuban communities. Neighborhood butchers in West Tampa still hand-filet beef in the Cuban way, and their small shops are replete with Cuban spices like bijol, and root vegetables like yucca and malanga, along with the ubiquitous sweet plantains. Major supermarkets, always an indicator of an area’s demographic makeup, feature a multitude of Cuban and Spanish products, from canned octopus in olive oil to caldo gallego (Galician soup), in cans and mixes for the lazy chef. These small signs of Cubanidad lend credence to Gallagher’s assertion that a true expatriate culture does not lose its fundamental identity, even after decades or generations (1980, p. 30).

Unquestionably, Miami’s exile community also is very Cuban in nature, appearance and feeling, although in a very different manner. Although Cubans inhabited Miami prior to 1959, the major Cuban center during the 1940s and 1950s was New York: census data show that there were almost 15,000 Cubans in New York, more than twice as many as the 6,496 who lived in Florida during the same period. Manhattan alone was home to 6,903 Cuban-born white persons. Only 1,300 Cubans were listed as living in Dade County; the remainder of the Cubans were scattered throughout the state, with the main concentration in
Hillsborough County, where Tampa is the county seat (University of Virginia Geospatial and Statistical Data Center, 1998). Some 18,000 Cubans lived in the U.S. during the bloody Machado dictatorship (1924-1933). On the eve of the Cuban Revolution, only 79,150 Cubans had trickled into the United States, many having moved there to escape the increasing violence of the Batista dictatorship (1952-1959).

The trickle became a flood after 1960. By 1970, there were more than 439,000 Cuban-born residents in the U.S.; by 1980, there were more than 600,000 Cubans; and by 1990, the number again had jumped to more than 736,000 (Gibson & Lennon, 1999). Today, an estimated 1.2 million Cubans and Cuban-Americans reside in the U.S. Census data indicate that about half of them reside in Miami and its environs; and although they live in every state in the union, substantial Cuban communities exist in north-central Florida, the New York-New Jersey area, California, and parts of Nevada and Arizona (Schmidley, 2003).

The migration vintages that ensued after the Cuban revolution of 1959 radically changed Miami, a town that previously had been considered by some northerners as a desirable retirement haven near the wealthy playground of Palm Beach. Scholars, including Mohl (1983, 1986) and Grenier and Stepick (1992), describe the population of Miami before 1960 as consisting largely “of black and white southern in-migrants and their descendants, transplanted northerners, including many Jews, and Bahamian and other Caribbean blacks and their descendants” (Grenier & Stepick III, 1992, p. 3). Before 1960, only 12 percent of the city was foreign-born; only 30 years later, the city would become a center of the country’s foreign born-population, with more than half its residents having arrived from different countries (Schmidley, 2003).

Those who settled in Miami during this latest Cuban exodus were of a decidedly different complexion. The very first arrivals—a mere 1 percent of those who would eventually arrive in the U.S.—were relatively wealthy people who sensed the change in the political winds and began to liquidate their investments in Cuba and transfer their holdings to the U.S. Most of these people had some connection to the U.S., they were considered white, and with their wealth and education, found it easier to adjust to life in Miami than those who would follow in subsequent years. Curiously, however, the experience of these first Cubans set the tone for the migration that ensued, thus, the false perception was propagated that most Cuban exiles in Miami were highly educated, white, and wealthy (Boswell, 1980, p. 105), and therefore more
desirable than other “Third World” immigrants.

In truth, many of those who arrived after 1960 were far from wealthy and highly educated, and they encountered numerous difficulties. Although they did not have to face the indignity of being labeled “illegal” aliens, they still faced language, and to some degree, racial barriers, since many Cubans, even those with white complexions, are of mixed racial heritage. Most Cubans arriving on the freedom flights were sponsored by churches and other non-profits, and resettled throughout the United States, but many more remained in Miami, causing overcrowding and severe housing shortages that resulted in higher rents. Some of their political and economic struggles to adapt to life in the U.S. were chronicled by cartoonist Silvio Fontanillas in the Miami-based humor magazine *Zig-Zag Libre.*

Like the original Tampa exiles, the Miami exiles sought to escape political upheaval in Cuba. Some might argue that the Miami Cubans, like the Tampa Cubans who had arrived throughout the wars of independence, considered themselves temporary residents of the U.S. who would return to their country once independence was achieved. However, it is perhaps more accurate to compare their situation to that of the Tampa Cubans who faced the unwelcome prospect of returning to a U.S.-occupied Cuba in 1898. Pérez writes about this group that “the end of the war in 1898 had immediate consequences for Cubans in exile. For many, support of the independence movement had defined in very specific terms the nature and function of exile. Peace transformed the meaning of exile” (1995, p. 30). The Cuban Revolution would come to mean the same to the Miami exiles—only they, expecting that the U.S. would invade Cuba and correct the situation, could not have known it at the time. In essence, the situation for the Miami exiles seemed to be less clean cut than it had been for their fellow émigrés in 1898.

In hindsight, there are parallels between both groups. In both cases, years of upheaval had indeed been resolved, and in both cases, the upheaval had resulted in a definitive change in government. In 1898, Cuba had been separated from its original colonizer, Spain, only to become a neo-colony of the United States, to the dismay of the Tampeños. Still, through the decades, Cuba managed to achieve some measure of liberation and self-determination, with the eventual repeal of the hated Platt Amendment in 1934 and the creation of the idealist Constitution of 1940.

The Cuban Revolution of 1959 in some ways paralleled the 1898 situation: once again Cuba
struggled to liberate itself from economic and political domination, this time by the U.S. The Revolution and its consequences again led to Cuba’s separation from one power, only to be, it seemed, consumed by another, this time the Soviet Union—again, to the dismay of the Miamienses. And yet again, Cuba has managed to achieve some measure of liberation and self-determination: the tiny island with the faltering economy and the recalcitrant dictator has managed to become a player on the world’s political stage. Regardless of sentiment, few can deny that Castro and Cuba influenced various nationalist movements in Africa and Latin America in the latter part of the 20th century. Even Castro’s enemies feel some grudging admiration for the man who has, at least publicly, refused to bow to the 40-year embargo imposed by the U.S.

Neither group imagined that their temporary stay in the U.S. would become permanent. The Tampa Cubans could not have known that the town they helped settle would eventually become a center of Cubanidad that would last more than 100 years, making it the most influential and longest-lasting Cuban community in the U.S. Likewise, the Miami Cubans who set foot in Miami in the 1960s with their few belongings could little imagine the power and influence that their community would eventually wield.

Both Tampeños and Miamienses became what Cobas and Duany (1997) call “middleman groups”: instead of becoming “peripheral employees” of the broader national economy, the way most immigrants do, they eventually formed a “substantial economic agglomeration” (p. 9) that served to provide needed goods and services to new arrivals from different countries. Although Cobas and Duany have studied Cuban exiles who fled to Puerto Rico in 1959, their conclusions that Cubans in Puerto Rico tended to engage in entrepreneurial pursuits designed to service members of their own communities, and generally employed other Cubans in these pursuits also, can be applied to communities in Tampa and Miami. Duany and Cobas’ noted that Cubans tended to hold better jobs and make higher incomes than their counterparts in Puerto Rico, and this also applied to the two Florida groups (p. 50-55). The Cubans’ tendency to act as middlemen also seemed to provide their communities with business and political leaders, and a link to the greater Anglo community in Florida.

In addition to achieving some measure of economic success, both groups were (and still are) politically active with regard to the Cuban cause. However, there are clear differences between the groups. For one, the Tampeños interacted with Spaniards, Italians and Germans,
as well as with other Cubans. Workers from all of these ethnic groups were integral to the cigar industry, from the production of the cigars, to the artwork and lithographic reproductions on the cigar boxes. Just as the Tampeños formed businesses to serve the needs of Cubans, so did the Spaniards, Italians and the Germans. Although the literature suggests that there was some measure of segregation in terms of the creation of separate newspapers, social clubs, and mutual aid societies for each ethnic group (Greenbaum, 1985, Mirabal, 1998, Long, 1965), there also is some indication that the groups periodically joined forces to secure goods and services for their respective communities, or to protest unfair working conditions imposed by the corporations that eventually took over the cigar factories.

Further, they all were joint settlers of Ybor City, a place described by historian Durward Long (1965) as a “swampy mosquito-infested location” that was injurious to health (p. 421). Their common struggle to provide adequate homes and medical care for themselves and their families in the dismally unsanitary conditions also fostered a sense of community among the groups.

Finally, all the ethnic groups were involved in class struggle, not just the Cubans. As outsiders who worked and lived together and who banded together to protest injustice, each group seemed to be less sensitive to criticism about itself from the Anglo community. Pérez (1995) and Hewitt (2001) illustrate this sense of unity among ethnic groups citing examples of the Weight Strike of 1899 and the General Walkout of 1901. In both cases, cigar makers were able to extract concessions from employers because of their ability to remain unified (Pérez, p. 31-32, Hewitt, chap. 7).²

The Miamenses differ in that they didn’t forge a similar sense of community with other ethnic groups. Their dramatic and abrupt arrivals, and their large numbers, quickly labeled

² That sense of community did not seem to ebb even when racism and the Great Depression spurred the northward migration of the Tampeño children of the cigar workers. Most headed to New York and New Jersey to work, lived there, settled, and surprisingly, started to trickle back into Tampa in the 1970s. The rejuvenation and continuing survival of the formerly moribund La Union Martí-Maceo club can be attributed to the significant numbers of Tampeños who returned to retire in their childhood hometown. According to Herman Munroe, former president of La Union Martí-Maceo, the social club had lost its original building to urban renewal and eminent domain laws in Tampa during the 1960s. By 1970, it faced dissolution due to its dwindling membership. The advent of Civil Rights laws in the 1960s and 1970s had further diminished the group’s purpose as a refuge against racism. But the return of the Tampeños infused the club with new membership; in 2000, it celebrated its 100th anniversary. Today, the club—still private—sponsors dances and some special events and activities. It once again faces dwindling membership as its older members die, even as it struggles to redefine itself in a quickly-changing, ever-developing Tampa Bay area (2003).
them as the dominant immigrant group in the Miami area, despite the transitory nature of their stay. Despite the fact that they established numerous businesses in Miami, some very lucrative, the Miami Cubans have continually self-identified as exiles. Rather than setting about to carve a niche for themselves in American society as an ethnic group, as do most immigrants and expatriates, the exile leadership had devoted itself to garnering political support to overthrow the government of Fidel Castro. In addition, for decades, Cubans have been perceived as jealously guarding their position as the region’s primary exile/immigrant group because they have resisted integration and cooperation with other ethnic groups.

Although both groups seemed to have participated in the “liberation” of their country in similar fashion—by forming political committees, and donating money and arms to their cause—their role in Cuban history thus far has been markedly different. Perhaps the reason for their cool reception by their fellow countrymen is that they lack two important elements that kept the Tampeños intrinsically linked to Cuban history and culture: one, they were unwilling or unable to maintain continued contact with Cuban society and culture by regularly traveling to the Cuban mainland; and two, they did not have the anchoring influence of the cigar factories, and the Cuban-connected economic, social and political enclaves they provided.

The economic, political, social and cultural characteristics of the Miamientes have been exhaustively examined by Portes in his various publications, as well as by González-Pando (1998), Zucker and Zucker (1996), Rieff (1995) and numerous others. Admittedly, Miami flourished with the influx of Cubans; the city was dubbed an economic miracle and its inhabitants the “golden exiles.” But there were problems as well. David Reiff notes in “From Exiles to Immigrants” (1995), that there was little incentive for the Cuban exiles to assimilate; given the U.S. history of intervention in Latin American affairs³, they had every reason to believe that the U.S. would invade the island and restore some version of the former regime. Even after the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban Missile Crisis and President Kennedy’s

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promise that the U.S. would not directly invade Cuba, Cuban exiles in Florida were still encouraged to form and train militia groups that periodically launched guerilla attacks on Cuban soil and, during the 1970s and 80s, targeted Cuban sympathizers in both Latin America and the United States. The operated without compunction and were responsible for the brazen murder of former Chilean diplomat Orlando Lettelier in Washington, D.C. To outsiders, wrote Reiff, the Cuban exile’s preoccupation with injustice and retribution quickly degenerated into “touchy, clannish self-absorption” (p. 76).

The roots of the problem, some argued, were exile leaders like alleged terrorist Orlando Bosch, and Jorge Mas Canosa; both men were representative of a segment of the community that advocated the violent overthrow of the Cuban government. In 1981, Mas Canosa founded the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), a Miami-based organization that was long considered to be the center of the Cuban “government in exile,” but the organization’s reputation was sullied by purported links to terrorist attacks that took place during the 1970s and 80s. There was constant tension between hard-line and more moderate Cubans, who like many liberal Anglos, disagreed with the embargo and the U.S. policy toward Cuba in general. Rumors of corruption amidst the ranks of the political hardliners strained relations between the anti-Castro Cubans and the rest of the county’s residents. Portes (1998a) notes that “it is but a slight exaggeration to say that under Mas’ influence, Miami began to acquire the features of a Latin American dictatorship, opposite in ideology but similar in ruthless effectiveness to the communist regime that it opposed” (p. 28).

Racism exacerbated the problems. Many exiles were raised in a racially segregated Cuba that resembled the antebellum South, so there is continuing racial tension between the whiter Cubans and their African-American and Afro-Caribbean neighbors, and sometimes, with Afro-Cubans as well, as documented during the Mariel Boatlift. Boswell suggests that racism played a role in the fact that few Afro-Cubans seemed to settle in Miami, preferring instead to live in more racially tolerant areas like New York and New Jersey, and creating a small, but significant ethnic economic enclave in Northern New Jersey. He notes that there was “evidence of resentment” among a minority of white Cuban exiles “toward Black Cubans because of a suspicion that many of the blacks welcomed the Castro revolution” (p. 106). While many of the Miami exiles found it difficult to accept racial equality, the Tampeños were more accepting, given their history and struggle to circumvent Jim Crow laws. Afro-Cubans, especially, managed to retain the Martían notions of liberty, self-reliance
and some measure of equality, thanks primarily to their links to the social clubs and mutual aid societies.

The *Miamienses*’ race and class prejudices also have contributed to their continued disconnection to the Cuban mainland and its culture. Boswell (1980), Everson (1994), Lockwood (1990) and others concur that the Castro Revolution did indeed improve economic conditions, to some degree, for the poorer Cubans and for Afro-Cubans, particularly those who lived in the more rural areas of the country. But the cultural end of the revolution also proceeded to destroy the social barriers that separated rich from poor, black from white, and men from women. For those Cubans whose Cuba was the equivalent of the antebellum south in its class, race and economic structure, the social changes were intolerable and served to further alienate them from the majority of the Cubans, who appeared to embrace the goals of the revolution.

The effect of the *Miamienses* and the *Tampeños* on Cuban history has been telling. The *Tampeños* of the early 20th century were embraced by their contemporaries; the *Miamienses* are still called *gusanos* (worms) by some of their contemporaries. The *Tampeños* traveled freely between the two countries, and there was a free exchange of knowledge between both groups. As a result, the history of the *Tampeños* has been folded into the history of the Cuban mainland, and the stories of the expatriates are told in tandem with those of the Cuban mainland. In contrast, the history of the *Miamienses* is fraught with fear and distrust on both sides. Miami has, in essence, become a static shrine to a pre-1959 Cuba, and that only can be perceived, for now, by Cuban supporters of the Revolution, as a total rejection of the social goals of the Revolution and a refusal to acknowledge the injustices that spurred the Revolution in the first place.

Portes has noted that the situation for the *Miamienses* is extremely fragile. Still dedicated to the overthrow of a regime, the exiles are determined to remain exiles. They feel threatened by efforts from Cuban émigrés who may be “softening” their attitude toward Castro, and they also feel threatened by requests from Florida’s Anglo community that they adjust their current way of life. For example, U.S. attitudes toward Cubans in the wake of the Mariel Boatlift hardened, mainly because the new arrivals were “poorer, blacker and gayer” than their predecessors. The resulting backlash spurred a rash of new legislation, including an “English-only” bill, and calls to tighten Cuban immigration to the United States (p. 394).
With the end of the Cold War, the *Miamienses* have had to face the fact that their exile may be permanent, and they must get down to the business of becoming one more ethnic group in the U.S. that must fight for its share of its rights and services in American society.

The exiles’ continuing battle against the “de-Cubanization of Miami,” as described by Grenier, Invernizzi, Salup, & Schmidt (1994), suggests that they still have trouble coming to terms with their identity as ethnic Americans. The struggle began in the early 1990s, when the *Miami Herald* proposed renaming a portion of Little Havana, the Cuban center of Miami, to the “Latin Quarter” so as to include more recent Latin American arrivals, including a growing Nicaraguan population. Miamenses perceived the proposal as a threat to the community’s position and identity, considering it a swipe by an Anglo community intimidated by its burgeoning political influence (p. 189-90).

The tension between the city’s Anglo and Cuban communities peaked after Mas Canosa’s death in 1998. In 1999, a tug-of-war ensued over 6-year-old Elián González, a Cuban refugee who was found in a raft off the shore of Florida. The boy, his mother and others in the raft had been “balseros,” Cubans who illegally escape from the island on home-made rafts. Somehow, the other balseros had died, leaving the boy the sole survivor. The youngster was placed in the custody of relatives in Miami and was slated to be returned to his father, who still lived in Cuba, when hardliners in Miami, notably members CANF, now led by Mas Canosa’s son, Jorge Mas Santos, waged a court battle to keep the boy in the U.S. Eventually, the boy was ordered by the courts to be returned to his father, but the family balked at returning him, and Attorney General Janet Reno felt compelled to send federal officers to forcibly retrieve the child.

The conflict that resulted polarized the city and much of the country between those who believed that the issue was, in fact, a custody battle and that since the boy had been illegally taken by his mother, the child should be returned to his father. Anti-Castro hardliners, however, argued that returning the boy was tantamount to condemning him to prison in Cuba. The bitterness that ensued divided the Cuban community and soured relations between the Cuban and Anglo communities in the city. The conflict also further polarized the

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4 The divisions and continuing resentment were cited by scholars as one of the main reason Miami’s Cubans abandoned the Democratic Party in 2000 (Mayer, 2001, p. 38; Posner, 2001, p. 213). This shift toward the right was...
relationship between the Cubans in Miami and those on the island, causing further distrust and resentment between the two groups.

Conclusion

It appears unlikely at this juncture that the Miamienses will ever evoke the reverence—or even the respect—assigned to Tampeños in Cuban society. Too much hostility has transpired between Cubans on the island and their exiled counterparts in Miami. Even as late as the summer of 2006, conflicts arose between both groups when the Miamienses rejoiced at news that Fidel Castro was seriously ill and had undergone intestinal surgery. The television broadcasts showed Cuban exiles waving flags and placards, lining Calle Ocho and yelling in joy to passersby that Fidel was dead. This only served to exacerbate the problems between both groups, especially since Castro is not dead yet. Surely, not all Cuban citizens agree with Castro and his policies, and in all probability, there are some Cubans who will celebrate his demise, but the blatant display of glee among the Miamienses was perceived by many Cubans to be in bad form (Piñero Estrada, Personal Communication, June 2006).

Only time will tell if the Miami exiles will ever redeem themselves in the eyes of their compatriots. If not, then the rift between the society on the island and its community on the mainland will continue even after Castro dies. It would be an untoward end to Cuba’s rich legacy of expatriate communities in the United States.

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significant because Cubans had voted Democratic in 1992 and 1996, in line with other Latino ethnic groups, and perhaps in light of their increasing awareness as an ethnic group.

5 The author was in contact via email with various Cubans on the island during this period. Although there was some trepidation over Castro’s condition, the general message received was “estamos bien”—“we’re fine, and all is calm here.” They also expressed considerable embarrassment over the behavior in Miami.


